By Annunthra Rangan
India’s national security concerns in its immediate neighbourhood focus primarily on the People’s Republic of China and Pakistan. China’s growing global influence, driven by its large economy and substantial military, has raised concerns in India. In addition to its significant military presence, China uses subtle methods to shape foreign policies and narratives that align with its interests. Chinese intelligence operations in India trace back to British times during World War II when the Chinese nationalists, allied with the West, began using propaganda. Over time, China has expanded its influence in India by engaging journalists, organisations with Marxist leanings, and think-tanks to shape narratives and gather intelligence on key sectors like defence, space, nuclear capabilities, and information technology.
China’s efforts extend beyond information gathering. It seeks to control the public narrative by downplaying unfavourable historical accounts and amplifying China’s achievements. These attempts have reached Indian industries such as Bollywood, where favourable narratives are being promoted. In addition, Beijing has established Confucius Institutes and think-tanks under the guise of cultural exchange, which are strategically designed to influence public opinion in China’s favour.
China’s influence operations focus on civilians, scientists, policy analysts, academicians, and journalists, targeting soft areas of influence without the need for direct military incursions. The Chinese government under Xi Jinping has taken an increasingly aggressive foreign policy stance, with efforts to spread China’s political model globally.
This includes substantial financial investments in media, think-tanks, and exchange programmes aimed at influencing young minds. Xi Jinping’s rise has marked a shift towards more overt actions, as seen in China’s approach to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India, which remains unresolved.
Globally, China’s assertiveness has drawn significant attention, particularly from the West, which has started countering Beijing’s efforts. The US, in particular, has imposed sanctions on Chinese companies like Huawei over concerns of data security and espionage, a move followed by several allies. Additionally, Chinese social media apps like TikTok and WeChat have come under scrutiny for allegedly funnelling user data to the Chinese government, with reports of censorship and surveillance, particularly in the context of pro-democracy movements and political dissent. Countries like the US, Australia, and the UK have since implemented measures to limit China’s influence in the technology and social media sectors.
In recent years, China has made concerted efforts to increase its influence in Bollywood, utilising co-productions and collaborations to further its propaganda goals. A notable example occurred at the 2019 Beijing International Film Festival, where prominent Indian filmmakers, including Shah Rukh Khan and Kabir Khan, participated. During this time, the Chinese government, under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Propaganda Department, began pushing for co-productions in Bollywood. Films selected for the festival underwent strict scrutiny to ensure they aligned with pro-CCP narratives, with Khan’s film Zero chosen as the closing feature, a symbolic gesture during the festival marking 70 years of CCP rule. The push for co-productions led to agreements between Indian and Chinese filmmakers to jointly produce films, continuing a trend that had been growing in previous years.
China has also formed industry associations specifically aimed at influencing the Indian film sector, with the India-China Film Society, established in 1949, serving as a key body in promoting CCP-aligned narratives in Indian cinema and literature. Chinese influence in Bollywood has also been felt through direct intervention. For example, during the production of the film, Rockstar, scenes featuring “Free Tibet” flags were censored, reportedly due to pressure from Chinese interests, under the justification that it would harm Sino-Indian relations. Furthermore, investigative reports have suggested that the Chinese government has inflated the success of Bollywood films in China to shape perceptions and amplify the influence of certain actors and films within India.
Beyond cinema, Chinese firms have made significant investments in Indian digital entertainment platforms. Xiaomi, for instance, invested $25 million in Hungama Digital Media Entertainment, a company that distributes Bollywood films and music, reaching millions of users. Similarly, Tencent invested over $115 million in Gaana, India’s largest music streaming service, and $110 million in MX Player, a popular entertainment app. Tencent has also invested in audio platforms like Pocket FM, expanding Chinese influence into India’s broadcasting and digital media landscape.
Within the academic and intellectual circles in India, a prominent university in the National Capital Region around Delhi has emerged as a hub for China-focused studies. It runs a flagship fellowship programme that facilitates the exchange of visiting scholars between India and China. This programme allows academics, policy experts, and professionals to work on China-related topics, providing them access to Chinese diplomats and regular visits to China. However, there have been concerns about the objectivity of the research conducted under this fellowship, as topics allocated to scholars appear to align with narratives favourable to China.
In addition, a new organisation based in Delhi, claiming to promote mutual understanding between India and China, functions in a manner akin to the Chinese embassy. Despite positioning itself as an independent body, its operations seem closely aligned with the CCP. The organisation actively promotes pro-China sentiments through initiatives like setting up China Study Centres in leading Indian universities. Advisors to this organisation include a journalist, an academic, and a former diplomat. Another influential entity, claiming to be an association of “young leaders,” has maintained strong connections with China. Members frequently visit China and the Chinese Embassy in India. This group has signed an MoU with the All-China Youth Federation, the CCP’s youth wing, further strengthening its ties with Chinese authorities.
In the think-tank space, there is a Lutyens-based research organisation that portrays itself as neutral, yet its work is perceived to favour China. Founded by a prominent pro-China academic, it avoids critical analysis of China’s expansionist policies or human rights abuses. Additionally, this think-tank has reportedly received substantial donations from the Chinese government and Chinese consulates in India, raising concerns about its influence on Indian policy-making.
Moreover, during the Covid-19 pandemic, China utilised Indian think-tanks and academic forums to project a positive image of its pandemic response, downplaying its role in the crisis. China also launched initiatives like the Indo-China Economic and Cultural Council to influence Indian opinion leaders, while its magazine, India-China Chronicle, frequently published content with a clear pro-China bias. China has been employing Indian media and journalists to further its influence in India. A notable example is journalist Rajeev Sharma, detained on charges of espionage for China. His writings, which include advocating for India to hand over the Dalai Lama to China, exemplify his long-standing support for Chinese interests. In publications such as The Diplomat and Global Times, Sharma consistently advanced China’s strategic objectives, including promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and undermining the Quad initiative.
Additionally, Chinese influence extends to Indian wire services. After the Galwan clash, the Press Trust of India (PTI) conducted a contentious interview with Chinese Ambassador Sun Weidong, which faced backlash for allegedly promoting Chinese narratives. This interview was subsequently posted on the Chinese Embassy website, sparking concerns over Indian media’s susceptibility to Chinese influence. Chinese investment in Indian news aggregators, such as ByteDance’s $25 million investment in Daily Hunt and Tencent’s $50 million in NewsDog, has raised alarms. These platforms target users in regional Indian languages, potentially threatening India’s internal stability.
China Radio International (CRI), broadcasting in Tamil, has also pushed pro-China narratives, including criticism of the Indian Army’s actions at the LAC. China’s media influence has been facilitated through journalism fellowships sponsored by the Chinese Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA). Indian journalists from leading outlets, such as The Indian Express and IANS, have participated, receiving favourable treatment in Beijing. These fellowships often result in pro-China reportage without disclosure of Chinese government sponsorship. Luxurious accommodations, stipends, and Chinese language classes are part of the package to deepen their exposure to the Chinese perspective.
Moreover, Chinese propaganda extends to paid media supplements. Hindustan Times has published several supplements under the title China Watch, praising China’s development efforts in Tibet and elsewhere. Similarly, The Indian Express carried a supplement in 2016, lauding China’s initiatives in Tibet. The Chinese government has also funded international media outlets, including The New York Times and Foreign Policy, to publish pro-China content disguised as legitimate news.
Chinese dominance in social media is reflected in their investments in various apps and platforms. For instance, Xiaomi and ShunWei Capital have invested over $18 million in the Indian social media platform ShareChat, while Tencent has injected $150 million into Hike Messenger. Alongside these financial investments, China also employs a CCP-backed group known as the “50 Cent Army” or “50 Cent Party”; These internet trolls are tasked with shaping pro-China narratives online. They are often recruited to create positive content about the CCP, while disrupting conversations critical of China and monitoring political adversaries both domestically and internationally.
These tactics extend beyond content manipulation to platforms where sensitive data may be vulnerable to espionage and blackmail, as was seen with the KGB during the Cold War. There are concerns that user data from apps owned by Chinese companies could be compromised, leading to blackmail attempts. The US government has identified certain apps as national security risks, ordering Chinese owners to divest their stakes.
India has also taken steps to mitigate these risks by banning several Chinese-funded apps due to national security concerns. In response, pro-China trolls, including some disguised as journalists, launched attacks questioning these actions. Moreover, China has used Indian social media accounts to promote pro-China narratives, often trending anti-India hashtags during periods of tension, such as the Ladakh standoff in June 2020.
China also collaborates with Pakistan in its misinformation campaigns. During the Ladakh standoff, fake Twitter and Telegram accounts, mostly originating from Pakistan, were found spreading disinformation about the India-China border situation. A Kochi-based cybersecurity firm identified that many of these accounts used fake Chinese identities and posted translated pro-China content to mislead Indian audiences.
Additionally, a report from ProPublica revealed that Chinese agencies have hacked accounts worldwide to spread propaganda on key issues, such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the Hong Kong protests. Twitter responded by suspending over 5,000 suspected Chinese-controlled accounts and banning 2,00,000 related inactive accounts. Despite these efforts, social media platforms, particularly YouTube, are accused of favouring profit-driven interests by allowing the silencing of voices critical of China, as they pursue access to the massive Chinese digital market. Facebook has also faced criticism for its handling of content related to China. For instance, it flagged an interview by WION with Chinese virologist Dr Li-Meng Yan, who claimed that Covid-19 was manufactured in a lab, as “fake news’. This raised concerns about the influence of Chinese pressure on global media platforms.
India has taken proactive measures to successfully counter China’s growing influence operations across academia, media, and culture, particularly in light of the escalating tensions between the two nations. These efforts have focused on safeguarding national security and curbing China’s soft power tactics. In 2017, a notable step was the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) withdrawing its annual grant to the Institute of Chinese Studies, a premier research centre in China, due to its independent stance on critical issues such as the BRI. This action reflected India’s broader strategy to reassess and tighten its academic engagements with Chinese entities.
Indian universities are now mandated to seek approval from the MEA and the Ministry of Home Affairs before initiating any academic collaborations with Chinese institutions. Existing agreements with Chinese universities are also under strict scrutiny, and no exchange programmes can proceed without prior governmental clearance. These restrictions apply to both public and private educational institutions, ensuring that no soft influence infiltrates Indian academia unchecked. Increased monitoring has been implemented for Chinese organisations like the Chinese Association for International Understanding, which is linked to the United Front Work Department, known for its influence activities. Indian authorities are closely examining any activities by such groups that could threaten national interests.
To further control Chinese presence, India has imposed new visa restrictions for Chinese nationals, including businessmen, academics, industry experts, and advocacy groups, all of whom now require prior security clearance before entry. In tandem, Mandarin has been removed from the list of suggested foreign languages in India’s National Education Policy, signalling a significant policy shift.
Indian universities are shifting their focus towards engaging Taiwanese Mandarin teachers and fostering partnerships with Taiwanese think-tanks, a move that aligns with India’s broader strategy to counter China’s influence by strengthening ties with Taiwan. This recalibration is part of a broader, regional pivot towards partners who share India’s strategic interests.
Recognizing the growing importance of expertise on China, the MEA has also launched initiatives such as the Chennai Centre for China Studies, recruiting Chinese-fluent consultants from the private sector. The centre’s goal is to provide in-depth analysis and formulate policies related to China, while also monitoring Chinese influence globally through reports from Indian missions abroad.
India’s heightened countermeasures have been driven in part by public sentiment following incidents such as the Doklam standoff and the Galwan Valley clashes, which have fuelled strong anti-China feelings. Nationalist groups within the country have rallied around these efforts, supporting stringent measures to combat Chinese influence. While other South Asian nations, like Bangladesh and Nepal, may not view China’s intentions as a threat and often balance their relations between India and China, India has taken a firm stance to curtail Chinese influence. Through a combination of academic restrictions, policy reforms, and strategic alliances, India has made substantial progress in countering China’s soft power and influence.
—The writer is a Research Officer at Chennai Centre for China Studies. Her research interests constitute China-WANA (West Asia and North Africa) relations and human rights