The Supreme Court has held that an employee, who died after meeting with a fatal accident during commute to work, was entitled to compensation under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923.
The Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice KV Viswanathan passed the order on Tuesday in case of a watchman, who died after meeting with a fatal accident, while commuting at midnight to his workplace.
In case a nexus existed between the commute and work, employment duties could extend to reasonable travel circumstances, noted the Court.
The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation awarded compensation to the family of the deceased watchman, however, the High Court reversed this ruling on the grounds that the accident did not arise ‘out of and in the course of employment’. This prompted the appellant to move the Supreme Court.
The insurance company and employer contested liability, asserting that the fatal accident did not arise “in the course of employment” under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, as the deceased had not yet arrived at the workplace when the incident occurred. They argued that the commute constituted a personal journey, unrelated to employment duties, and thus fell outside the Act’s protective scope.
Authored by Justice Viswanathan, the verdict rejected the respondent’s contention and observed that ‘arising out of and in the course of employment’ under Section 3 of EC Act, was in Pari Materia with Section 51E of the Employees State Insurance (ESI) Act, 1948, introduced in 2010, which deemed commuting accidents as employment-related if the journey was tied to work obligations.
It observed that in the present case, it was examining whether a meaning given to the phrase ‘arising out of and in the course of employment’ insofar as it dealt with accidents happening while commuting to the place of work and vice versa in the ESI Act, could be said to be the same for the phrase ‘accident arising out of and in the course of employment’ occurring in Section 3 of the EC Act.
In cases where statutes in pari materia served a common object in absence of any provision indicating to the contrary, it was permissible for a court of law to ascertain the meaning of the provision in the enactment by comparing its language with the other enactment relating to the same subject matter, it added.