India Legal summarizes some of the well-known contempt cases in Indian judiciary
Arundhati Roy vs Unknown on 6 March, 2002, in Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court took objections to an article written by writer-activist Arundhati Roy in Outlook and felt that the comments made by her were, prima facie, a misrepresentation of the proceedings of the court, which had passed various orders to address the concerns raised by Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA).
The court observed that the judicial process and the institution itself cannot be permitted to be scandalized or subjected to contumacious violation in such a blatant manner. The action of Roy had anguished the court and it expressed displeasure on her distorted writing, or over the manner in which leaders of the petitioner Medha Patkar and one Dharmadikhari acted in breach of the injunction, despite giving assurance to the court. But it did not issue any contempt proceedings against the petitioner, its leaders or Roy.
However, the scenario changed after a contempt proceeding was filed by JR Parashar, advocate, in 2001.According to the allegations made by him, the respondents named in the petition, led a huge crowd on 30-12-2000 and held a dharna in front of Supreme Court and shouted abusive slogans against it, including those ascribing lack of integrity and dishonesty to judiciary. Contempt proceeding notices were issued to the respondents and they admitted there was a dharna outside the gates of the apex court on 30-12-2000 and it was organised by NBA and those who lived in the Narmada Valley. They had vented their anguish over the majority judgment of the apex court relating to the building of the dam on the Narmada river.
The court took objections to some portions of the response filed by one of the respondents, Arundhati Roy. The response, according to court, imputed motives to specific courts for entertaining litigations and passing orders against her. The court felt that Roy had accused it of harassing her to cite that it was carrying out a personal vendetta against her. It observed that she brought in matters which had no links with this case. Roy stood by her comments in court, even if they were contumacious. A notice was issued against her as to why she should not be proceeded against for contempt of court.
Roy reiterated her position in her response. She stated that the people of the Narmada Valley have the constitutional right to protest peacefully against what they consider an unjust and unfair judgment. She also claimed her right for a peaceful protest, even if it was outside the Supreme Court and said that as a writer she had the right to state her opinions and beliefs.
“As a free citizen of India, I have the right to be part of any peaceful dharna, demonstration or protest march. I have the right to criticize any judgment of any court that I believe to be unjust. I have the right to make common cause with those I agree with. I hope that each time I exercise these rights I will not dragged to court on false charges and forced to explain my actions.” she responded.
As the respondent did not show any repentance or regret or remorse, the court felt that no lenient view should be taken in the matter. However, showing the magnanimity of law by keeping in mind that the respondent is a woman, and hoping that better sense and wisdom shall dawn upon her in future, Roy was sentenced to simple imprisonment for one day with a fine of Rs. 2,000.
In case, Roy defaulted in the payment of fine, the court ruled that she be sentenced to simple imprisonment for three months.
PN Duda vs VP Shiv Shankar & Others on 15 April, 1988 in Supreme Court of India
The respondent No. 1, P Shiv Shankar, the minister of law, justice and company affairs at that time, delivered a speech at a meeting of the Bar Council of Hyderabad. The petitioner PN Duda alleged that in that speech Shankar had made statements dero-gatory to the dignity of the Supreme Court, attri-buting to the court partiality towards affluent people and using extremely intemperate and undignified language, and that the speech contained slander cast on this court both in respect of the judges and the working of the court.
The petitioner stated that he had approached the attorney general of India and the solicitor general of India to give their consent for initiating contempt proceedings. With both declining to deal with his prayer, an application for initiation of contempt under section 15(1)(a) and (b) of the act read with explanation (1) and rule 3(a), (b) and (c) of the contempt of Supreme Court Rules, 1975, was made, wherein Shankar, the attorney general, the solicitor general were made parties. The court issued notice.
In response, Shankar filed an affidavit stating that he had delivered the speech on the subject of accountability of the legislature, executive and the judiciary and had made the comments on the accountability of the three organs and the theoretical implications thereof, and that he had intended no disrespect to any of the institutions or its functionaries, much less the Supreme Court. It was further stated that the contempt petition was not maintainable without the consent of the attorney general or the solicitor general.
In the meantime, RN Trivedi, advocate, filed an application, claiming right to be impleaded as a party, stating that the attorney general and the solicitor general should not have been made parties to the contempt petition and that the alleged non-exercise of the jurisdiction by the attorney general and the solicitor general had not constituted contempt within the meaning of section 2(c) of the act.
Declining to initiate contempt proceeding and dismissing the petition and disposing of the application filed by RN Trivedi, the court observed that in the free market place of ideas, criticism about the judicial system or judges should be welcomed, so long as such criticisms do not impair or hamper the administration of justice; in this case, the court had examined the entire speech. It felt that Shankar had examined the class composition of the Supreme Court, and though at places, intemperate, the statement of the minister could not be said to amount to interference with the administration of justice and contempt of court.
Baradakanta Mishra vs Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra on 21 June, 1974, in Supreme Court of India
In this matter, the appellant, a member of the judicial service of Orissa was promoted as addl. district and sessions judge on 31-7-1968. But on 30-3-1972, he was suspended by the high court as a disciplinary enquiry was decided to be started against him. On 29-4-1972, the appellant was chargesheeted and called upon to showcause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. In the meantime, the appellant appealed to the governor, complaining against the order of suspension and requesting him to cancel it on the ground that it was outside the authority of the high court. The high court withheld the appeal of the appellant and refused to forward it to the governor since, in its opinion, no appeal lay to the governor against an order of suspension passed by the high court. The appellant, thereafter, forwarded directly a representation to the governor with a copy to the high court, and by this representation, he moved the governor to transfer the disciplinary enquiry against him to the Administrative Tribunal. There were several submissions made in this representation which scandalized the high court and tended to lower its prestige, etc. The high court, therefore, suo motu, issued a notice dated 3-7-1972, calling upon the appellant to showcause why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
The appellant appeared in answer to the notice and raised several contentions. One of the contentions was that whatever he had said in regard to the judges of the high court in the representation was in regard to their conduct in the discharge of administrative functions and not judicial functions and therefore, it did not amount to contempt of court. The appellant pleaded before the full bench that this contention should be tried as preliminary issue, but the full bench rejected the plea of the appellant. The appellant thereupon, preferred a petition for special leave to appeal to this court, and in this petition, the appellant once again made submissions, which prima facie, appeared to be criminal contempt of court. The petition was rejected by this court, but the high court, taking note of the objectionable submissions contained in the petition, issued a supplementary notice to the appellant to showcause why he should not be punished for having committed contempt of court by publishing such statements.
In the meanwhile, the disciplinary enquiry instituted against the appellant was entrusted to a single judge and he submitted his report to the high court, which based on the report, reduced him to the rank of ADM, Judicial.
The appellant, however, took the view that some of the issues arising in the disciplinary enquiry were the same as those arising in the proceeding for contempt pending against him, and the decision on those issues by the high court amounted to prejudging them in the proceedings for contempt, a judicial proceeding, and the chief justice and other judges of the high court, who decided the disciplinary enquiry, were, therefore, guilty of criminal contempt of their own high court. As soon as the proceeding for contempt was decided by the high court, he moved the full bench for initiating a proceeding for contempt against the chief justice and other judges in their personal capacity.
However, the full bench ruled that there was no contempt of court committed by the chief justice and other judges. and by reason of Section 15 (1), the appellant was not entitled to move the high court for taking action against the chief justice and other judges since he had not obtained the consent in writing from the advocate general.
The appellant, thereupon, purporting to appeal under Section 19(1) preferred the present appeal to this court. But a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal was raised by the respondent.
The case ended with this court taking the stand that the preliminary objection raised by the respondent was well founded and the appellant was not entitled to maintain the present appeal under Section 19 (1). The appeal was dismissed.
Vinay Chandra Mishra (The … vs Unknown…) on 10 March, 1995, in Supreme Court of India
In this case, Bansal Forgings Ltd took loan from UP Financial Corporation and made default in payment of instalment of the same. The corporation proceeded against the company under Section 29 of the UP Financial Corporation Act. The company filed a civil suit against the corporation and also fielded an application for grant of temporary injunction. The counsel for the corporation suo motu put appearance in the matter before trial court and prayed for time for filing of reply.
The trial court passed an order on the said date that the corporation will not seize the factory of the company. The company shall pay the amount of instalment and furnish security for the disputed amount. The court directed that security be furnished on 31-1-94 and the case was fixed on 15-3-94. During the proceeding, the judge put a question to BC Misra (who appeared for UP Finance Corporation) under which provision this order has been passed.
“On putting the question, he started to shout and said that no question could have been put to him. He will get me transferred or see that impeachment motion is brought against me in parliament,” the order said. He asked the judge to follow the practice of this court. The judge further held that “it is not the question of insulting of a judge of this institution, but it is a matter of institution as a whole. In case dignity of the judiciary is not being maintained, then, where this institution will stand. In case a senior advocate, president of Bar and chairman of the Bar Council of India behaves in court in such manner, what will happen to other advocates”. The court held that “the contemner is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six weeks”. However, the sentence will remain “suspended for a period of four years and may be activated in case the contemner is convicted for any other offence of contempt of court within the said period. The contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an advocate for a period of three years from today, with the consequence that all elective and nominated offices/posts at presents held by him in his capacity as an advocate, shall stand vacated by him forthwith”.
Harish S/O Mahadeo Pimpalkhute … vs Bal Thackeray AND ORS on 7 February, 1997, in Bombay High Court
In this case, it was alleged that respondent no 1, Bal Thackeray, on 21-10-1996 at a Dasera rally at Shivaji Park, Mumbai, made a statement, which precisely contains that he was reported by someone that a judge demanded `35 lakh for delivering a judgment in his favor.
The petitioners, therefore, prayed for action against respondent No 1 and newspapers for committing contempt of court. The court held that Thackeray suffer sentence of “simple imprisonment for a period of one week and pay a fine of Rs 2,000 and in default, he shall suffer additional sentence of simple imprisonment for a period of two weeks.”
Shyamal Krishna Chakraborty vs Sukumar Das And Ors. on 27 July, 2001, in Calcutta High Court
In this case, the petitioner, a bus conductor, was terminated, inter alia, on the ground of unauthorized absence. Against the order, an appeal was filed to the appellate authority under the rules but was rejected. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed.
A judge of the Calcutta High Court while hearing the writ petition quashed both the orders of the disciplinary authority and appellate authority. However, the matter was ultimately remanded to the appellate authority for consideration afresh in accordance with the provision of the law, and after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Against the said order, the aforesaid appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the high court and it allowed the appeal with the direction to reinstate the petitioner with consequential benefits. After the order of the appellate court was communicated, the contemners reinstated the petitioner but did not pay the arrears of salaries and benefits together with increments for the period 29-1-1991 to 26-5-1999.
It was submitted that there was a contumacious disregard of the high court’s judgment and order. The high court ruled that contempt in the case had not been committed by the contemners as it was not a deliberate defiance of the court’s order but an erroneous appreciation of the purport of the court’s order. The high court directed that contemners must pay the petitioner the entire salary to which he is entitled to in normal circumstances for the period he was kept out of employment as a result of the impugned order.
State Of Kerala vs M.S. Mani And Ors on 6 September, 2001, in Supreme Court of India
In the present case, a contempt petition was filed by the State of Kerala complaining that the dignity and authority of the apex court was undermined by the respondents by publishing a three-column news on the front page of the newspaper, The Kerala Kaumudi, on 5-5-1999. In the said column, the alleged contemnor imputed scandalous, malicious, vilificatory, defamatory and libelous criticism against KN Bhat, a senior advocate of the Supreme Court, MK Damodaran, Advocate General of Kerala and G Prakash, standing counsel for Kerala. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the contempt petition is not maintainable, inasmuchas consent of the learned attorney general/solicitor general under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act was not obtained before filing the contempt petition.
However, the court held that “the Contempt Petition was filed on May 17, 1999, and the consent of the learned Attorney General was obtained on May 11, 2000. It is, however, submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that now Section 15 has been complied with.
“We are unable to accede to this contention. The fact remains that the motion to take action against the respondents under Section 15 was not made with the consent of the learned Attorney General or Solicitor General and therefore is incompetent. Sub-sequent obtaining of the consent, in our view, does not cure the initial defect so as to convert the incompetent motion into a maintainable petition” and hence dismissed the petition.
Kallol Guha Thakurata And Anr. vs Biman Basu, Chairman, Left Front … on 31 March, 2005, in Calcutta High Court
In this case, a judge of the Calcutta High Court by a judgment and order dated 29.09.2003 (hereinafter called the said order) initiated a suo motu proceeding against DC (Traffic), Kolkata and others, and in the said proceeding passed certain orders for controlling the holding of public meetings within certain fixed hours on weekdays and also gave certain directions in connection therewith.
The occasions for passing those orders arose as the judge, while coming to high court on 24.09.2003, felt obstructed by a procession as a result of which the traffic went haywire and his car got stuck in the jam. Since the said order contained several directions for controlling the holding of public meetings as also various directions on the public authorities in order to keep the streets of Kolkata free from such meetings, obviously it touched upon matters of public interest. Most of the newspapers lauded it and there was considerable media coverage over it.
However, some political parties thought differently and felt that the said order curtailed the right of people to hold demonstration and public meetings on the streets of Kolkata. Biman Basu of CPM, a leading political figure, also vociferously criticized it and various newspapers published the criticism.
Notices were directed to be served on those newspapers asking them to showcause why contempt rule should not be issued against them for publishing the statements of Basu in respect of the said order. The court held: “Now so far as the newspapers and TV Channels are concerned, this Court does not think that they are guilty of contempt. They have reported what has been stated by Shri Basu. They have stated before the Court that they do not share the views of Shri Basu, but they report the same as the views of Shri Basu are newsworthy and concern matters of public interest.
“The Court holds that the newspapers and the TV Channels have a right of reporting the statements of Shri Basu and by way of innocent reporting, no contempt has been committed by them.”
The court held that Basu is guilty of contempt and punished him by simple imprisonment of three days and held that he also has to pay a fine of `10,000, and in default, to suffer further simple imprisonment of one day.
Monika & Ors vs Govt Of Nct & Anr on 21 March, 2013 in Delhi High Court
The order was written by Justice Kailash Gambhir. The challenge in these petitions had been made to the maintainability of the contempt petition bearing No. 331/1 and the notices of contempt dated 24.9.2009 issued therein by the concerned magistrate to these petitioners. Judge Gambhir quashed the contempt order based on several observations and comments made by him, the relevant portions of which are produced below in full:
“I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length and given my conscious considerations to the arguments advanced by them.
“The question whether there is contempt of court or not is undoubtedly a very serious question. For the survival of the rule of law, the orders of the courts have to be obeyed by one and all unless such orders are modified or stayed by the higher courts. Incidents which undermine the dignity of the courts have to be viewed very seriously and also dealt with swiftly. The dignity and authority of the courts has to be respected and maintained at all stages and by all concerned, failing which the very constitutional scheme and public faith in the judiciary would run the risk of being lost. Having said this, it is also a settled legal position that the contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature must not conclude in conviction for alleged act of contempt unless a clear cut case of obstruction in administration of justice is made out against the alleged contemnor who with a clear cut intention and contumacious conduct, not explainable otherwise, commits any act of contempt thereby flouting or defying the orders of the court. It has been held by the Apex court in Debrata Bandopadhyay and Ors. v. The State of West Bengal and Anr., AIR 1960 SC 189 that
“ ‘A question whether there is contempt of court or not is a serious one. The court is both the accuser as well as the judge of the accusation. It behoves the court to act with as great circumspection as possible making all allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties arising from inveterate practices in courts and tribunals. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct not explainable otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be punished. It must be realised that our system of courts often results in delay of one kind or another. The remedy for it is reform and punishment departmentally. Punishment under the law of contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one’s duty and in defiance of authority. To take action in an unclear case is to make the law of contempt do duty for other measures and is not to be encouraged.’…
Rajesh Kumar Singh vs High Court Of Judicature Of Madhya … on 31 May, 2007, in Supreme Court of India
In this case, Pradeep Mittal, judicial magistrate, first class, Dabra, sent a report dated 1.11.1999 to the inspector general of police, Gwalior circle, alleging that Chander Bhan Singh Raghuvanshi, station officer, Pichhor, came inside his court hall and threatened him.
Mittal alleged that Raghuvanshi said that Mittal did not do any good by initiating contempt proceedings against him before the high court, and he was back at Pichhor police station; he threatened that he would set Mittal right like he had done with other magistrates in the past.
The magistrate complained that it was unbecoming of a police officer to threaten a judicial officer in court and interrupt court proceedings, and the misbehavior warranted stern action. Mittal enclosed a copy of the order-sheet dated 1.11.1999 (recording the incident) and statements of two witnesses.
Long before the 1.11.1999 incident, the high court had initiated contempt proceedings against Raghuvanshi on an earlier reference by Mittal, in regard to a false report submitted by him to his court in April, 1998.
The second reference made by Mittal was also placed before the high court, in the pending contempt proceedings.
The high court took note of the second reference on 12.1.2000 and issued a showcause notice to Raghuvanshi.
In response, Raghuvanshi submitted his reply stating that he had not misbehaved with the judge. In support of his defense, he produced the inquiry report, dated 27.11.1999, submitted by the appellant to the superintendent of police along with statements of the witnesses examined in the inquiry.
The high court disposed off the contempt proceedings against Raghuvanshi by holding him guilty on both incidents and imposed a punishment of three months’ simple imprisonment.
With regard to the second reference, the high court held that Raghuvanshi had not only misbehaved with the judge on 1.11.1999 but had also raised a false defense by alleging that the magistrate had acted with malice.
Narendra D V Gowda S/O B … vs Vineet Jain on 4 July, 2012 in Karnataka High Court
In this case, the petitioners who were practising advocates of the Karnataka High Court filed contempt against three leading newspapers, including The Times of India and Hindustan Times, for publishing comments of the public to a news item published online which criticized a statement made by the court.
A reaction was published: “Comparison of Karnataka DGP with Saddam Hussein ‘unfortunate’: Chidambaram”.
It was submitted by the complainants that the publication of comments was nothing but sheer acts of contempt. They alleged that the comments published brought the entire judiciary in disrepute as an institution, and, therefore, action under the contempt act deserved to be taken against the alleged contemnor.
The high court dismissed the petition stating that due procedure laid down therein must be adhered to—while scrutinizing or dealing with the petitions filed by a private party seeking action of criminal contempt of high court on the basis of the information disclosed therein—if such petition is filed without seeking consent in writing of the Advocate General.
—Courtesy: indiankanoon.org