Modi’s visit to Japan, followed by the Chinese president coming to India, has important strategic advantages
By Col R Hariharan
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s hectic travel schedule within the first four months in office would indicate that his foreign policy initiatives are much more than “mending fences” with India’s immediate neighbors. Recently, he neatly squared it up with this catch phrase “Look East, Link West (LELW).”
Following on that slogan, he started to boost ties with the East. His visit to Japan, weeks before Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Delhi, along with President Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Vietnam and Modi’s maiden trip to the US, lays down the broad strategic contours of LELW.
SUCCESSFUL VISIT
Modi made a mark in Japan more strongly than any of his predecessors. It went well beyond the warm, personal equation
he enjoys with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Modi put through a well-orchestrated program to appeal to all sections of Japanese society, indicating his interest in building people-to-people equations as well. Though it fell short of Indian expectations, the visit was a success, as it paved the way for speeding up multi-faceted cooperation with Japan.
The visit also sent a strong message to China that India’s foreign policy revamp would be broad-based and national interest would be the top priority. Though the much-awaited India-Japan civilian nuclear deal did not come through, the two leaders agreeing to accelerate talks on a nuclear energy pact was probably germane to President Xi’s offer to India to collaborate in the nuclear energy sector as well.
Modi’s Japan visit was being closely followed by China, if we go by the outpouring of articles on it in the Chinese language media. It highlighted the strategic security aspects of the visit before President Xi visited India from September 17-19. Japan’s promised $34 billion investment in India over the next five years and likely sale of Japanese amphibious aircraft to India were widely reported in China.
The title of an editorial in the Global Times was “Modi-Abe intimacy brings scant comfort” and sums up China’s discomfort with this visit. The op-ed piece in the Communist Party’s web magazine appa-rently tried to read between the lines with regard to Modi’s calling on both the countries to strengthen strategic cooperation to promote peace and prosperity in Asia and counter an expansionist mindset.
These were Modi’s remarks while addressing business leaders in Tokyo: “Every-where around us, we see an 18th century expansionist mindset: encroaching on another country, intruding in others’ waters, invading other countries and capturing
territory.” This could have triggered China’s irritation and the editorial added: “Japanese and western public opinion view his remarks as a clear reference to China, alth-ough he did not mention China by name. This interpretation made some sense because Modi is more intimate to Tokyo emotionally. Therefore, it is perhaps a fact that he embraces some nationalist sentiments against China.”
The Global Times tried to show the ad-vantage of having relations with China by saying: “The increasing intimacy between Tokyo and New Delhi will bring, at the most, psychological comfort to the two countries. What is involved in China-India relations denotes much more than the display of the blossoming personal friendship between Modi and Abe. After all, Japan is located far from India. Abe’s harangue on the Indo-Pacific concept makes Indians comfortable.”
It reminded the readers that it is South Asia “where New Delhi has to make its presence felt. However, China is a neighbor it can’t move away from. Sino-Indian ties can, in no way, be counterbalanced by the Japan-India friendship…. Both as new emerging countries and members of BRICS, China and India have plenty of interests in common. Geopolitical competition is not the most important thing for the two countries, at least at present.”
Modi with Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng
GROWING DISCOMFORT
Such comments show China’s difficulty in coming to terms with Modi’s readiness to improve relations with it to do business on the one hand, while showing equal keenness to improve strategic cooperation with Japan on the other. This is compounded by Modi inviting Japanese investments in infrastructure, particularly railways, and manufacturing industries, many of which would directly compete with China’s trade and investment interests in India. And Japan’s readiness to ease export restrictions to allow its defense firms to participate in India’s huge weapons market is an offer that China cannot match.
The irony of Modi’s trip to Japan was that it coincided with the 69th anniversary of Japanese surrender, celebrated with all pomp and show in China. Even as Modi was completing his five-day Japanese sojourn, Xi urged Japan “to admit and reflect on its history of militarist aggression”. He also sounded an ominous warning to Japan: “With the utmost resolution and effort, we will join with people all over the world to safeguard the victory in the Chinese Peoples’ War of Resistance against Japanese aggression and the world war against fascism.”
India knows its strategic relations with Japan will be conditioned by Japan’s umbi-lical relations with the US. In case of any India-China confrontation, this could act as rider on Japan’s support for India. This limits the scope for India-Japan strategic relations to flourish.
President Pranab Mukherjee watching a cultural performance in Ho Chi Minh City during his Vietnam visit in September
STRATEGIC OPTION
Meanwhile, China has the strategic option to tweak the border issue with India at a time of its choosing. Its intrusions across the Line of Actual Control in Chumar and Demchok areas on the eve of Xi’s visit demonstrated it. India does have a similar advantage in tweaking the borders or in triggering the Tibetan issue. It suits both India and China to maintain the status quo.
China has already entered South Asia in a big way. It is selling its Maritime Silk Road (MSR) concept to India’s neighbors and wants India also to partner China in this endeavor. Given MSR’s negative strategic implications, it could benefit India only if Chinese involvement in South Asia is managed properly. This is possible only if cordial relations are maintained between both.
One of the key objectives of Xi’s talks with Modi has been to wean away India from the lure of Japan. The huge delegation of Chinese business leaders and five major banks accompanying the Chinese president underscored Xi’s serious efforts to win over Modi. For the same reason, probably Xi thought it wiser to postpone his visit to Pak-istan, originally clubbed with his Delhi trip.
Chinese analyst Liu Zongyi, writing in the Global Times, aptly summed up Modi’s dilemma: “Modi’s biggest challenge is to kick-start a lagging economy. India needs Japan’s investment and technology, but it also needs economic cooperation with China.” But the Chinese troops’ intrusion exposes the soft underbelly of India-China relations. And this is where Japan has an edge over China in dealing with India.
The Global Times editorial observed: “Maintaining strategic independence is India’s diplomatic tradition. It’s also in the Indian interest to be a balancer in the international system.” This shows its expectations from India.
(The writer is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group)