By Dr Swati Jindal Garg
The Ernakulam Bench of the Kerala High Court has taken a literal interpretation of Section 115(1) of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, to overturn the conviction of a woman accused of killing her three-year-old son and subsequently attempting suicide. The ruling could have profound implications for how Indian courts treat cases involving severe stress and criminal liability under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860.
The case in question involved a woman who, in 2010, smothered her 3¾-month-old son to death with her bare hands. Following the act, she attempted to take her own life by inflicting multiple cut injuries on her body using a steel blade. She was charged under Sections 302 (murder) and 309 (attempt to commit suicide) of the IPC. The trial court found her guilty on both counts.
The woman appealed to the Kerala High Court, where her counsel argued that the prosecution had failed to establish a clear motive for the crime. More crucially, her defense invoked Section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act, contending that the entire prosecution was rendered invalid under this provision.
Understanding Section 115
Section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, states: “Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), any person who attempts to commit suicide shall be presumed, unless proved otherwise, to have severe stress and shall not be tried and punished under the said Code.” Section 309 of the IPC states: “Whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of such offence, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.”
The Clash Between IPC And Mental Healthcare Act
The juxtaposition of these two provisions creates a legal dichotomy. Section 115 places the burden on the prosecution to prove that the accused was not suffering from severe stress at the time of the suicide attempt. This puts the prosecution in a difficult position—forced to prove a negative—often leading to acquittals under Section 309.
A key problem is the vagueness of the term “severe stress”, which remains undefined under the Act. This leaves the term open to judicial interpretation, resulting in potentially inconsistent rulings across different cases and benches.
Scope Of “Severe Stress”—Prolonged Or Momentary?
The lack of clarity in the law raises the question: should Section 115 protections apply only when severe stress stems from a diagnosable mental illness, or should they also apply to momentary emotional crises?
For instance, if a student attempts suicide after failing an exam, would courts consider this a product of “severe stress” under Section 115? Or would it simply be dismissed as recklessness? Current trends suggest that courts lean towards the latter interpretation, denying the benefit of the Act in such cases.
Suicide As Protest Or Religious Practice
Another layer of complexity emerges when suicide is motivated by ideology or faith—such as in the Jain practice of Santhara (ritual fasting unto death) or self-immolation as a form of political protest. Should individuals in such cases be punished under Section 309, or does Section 115 apply regardless of motive? These ambiguities remain unresolved, and judicial interpretations vary widely.
Kerala High Court’s Sweeping Interpretation
Until recently, Section 115 was largely understood to decriminalize suicide attempts, offering a rebuttable presumption of severe stress that the prosecution could contest. However, the Kerala High Court’s recent literal interpretation of Section 115 has gone a step further—extending immunity not just from Section 309, but from all IPC offences committed in the same transaction.
The Division Bench, comprising Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V and Justice PV Balakrishnan (who authored the judgment), ruled that a plain reading of Section 115 indicates that, unless proved otherwise, anyone attempting suicide must be presumed to suffer from severe stress and cannot be tried or punished under the IPC at all.
The Court emphasized the deliberate legislative choice of referring to “the said Code” (meaning the IPC in its entirety) rather than just Section 309. This, the Court held, was a clear indication that the bar against prosecution applies to all IPC offences, not just the attempted suicide itself.
Rehabilitation, Not Retribution
The Court also cited Section 115(2), which mandates that the government provide care, treatment, and rehabilitation for individuals attempting suicide due to severe stress. The Court reasoned that imprisonment for other IPC offences arising from the same incident would contradict this legislative intent.
The judgment explicitly described persons suffering from severe stress as victims of circumstances rather than offenders, aligning with the broader intent of the Mental Healthcare Act—to replace punishment with care and rehabilitation. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Common Cause vs Union of India was also cited, in which the apex court endorsed similar principles regarding stressed individuals and criminal liability.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION AND PRESUMPTION OF STRESS
The Kerala High Court further held that since the Mental Healthcare Act came into force in 2018, and the trial court’s judgment came later, the trial court should not have proceeded with the case at all. The prosecution failed to present any evidence rebutting the presumption of severe stress, making the accused eligible for full acquittal.
A Boon Or Bane?
This sweeping interpretation has provoked serious debate. With suicide rates climbing in India, National Crime Records Bureau data indicates that for every completed suicide, 25 attempts are made. Section 115 was intended to decriminalize suicide attempts and reduce the additional stress of legal proceedings, but the Kerala High Court’s interpretation could have the unintended consequence of offering blanket immunity for all IPC offences committed in the course of a suicide attempt.
Given the ubiquity of stress in modern life, courts may struggle to determine whether stress qualifies as “severe” under Section 115. If mere inability of the prosecution to disprove stress grants full immunity, could Section 115 be exploited as a defense to escape liability for serious crimes?
The Road Ahead
Whether the Kerala High Court’s literal interpretation serves the interests of those genuinely suffering from severe stress, or whether it becomes a legal loophole for offenders to evade punishment, remains to be seen. With such far-reaching consequences, the Supreme Court may eventually need to clarify and set boundaries around the scope of Section 115.
—The author is an Advocate-on-Record practising in the Supreme Court, Delhi High Court and all district courts and tribunals in Delhi