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Cautious Optimism

India’s talks with Afghanistan pose both challenges and opportunities. As China’s influence grows and the Taliban seeks to establish its presence in Delhi, India must navigate these complexities with élan

By Annunthra Rangan

In a diplomatic initiative, India recently commenced discussions with the Taliban-led government in Kabul, signalling an active approach to enhancing economic and political relations. The dialogues primarily centered on the expansion of bilateral relations, specifically focusing on economic cooperation, transit and trade. The Indian delegation acknowledged the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s (IEA) efforts in ensuring security and stability within the country, combating narcotics, countering the threat posed by ISKP (Islamic State – Khorasan Province) and addressing corruption.

The Indian team also conducted meetings with former Afghan president Hamid Karzai, officials from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Afghan business representatives. In June 2022, India effectively reinstated its embassy in Kabul, deploying what it has termed as a technical team to manage the mission. 

This diplomatic engagement underscores India’s strategic interests in the region, particularly considering the evolving political landscape following the Taliban’s assumption of power in Afghanistan. By engaging with this government, India aims to leverage existing infrastructure such as the Chabahar Port in Iran to facilitate trade and transit between the two countries. 

The Chabahar Port holds strategic importance for both Teheran and New Delhi. India has actively engaged in the development of this port to establish trade routes to Afghanistan, circumventing Pakistan’s historical limitations on land-based trade between New Delhi and Kabul. Presently, India is exploring the potential integration of the Chabahar Port into the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). This mega project covers approximately 7,200 km and aims to strengthen trade and transit connectivity among India, Iran and Afghanistan, as well as other nations such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia and Europe. The development of the Bamiyan-Herat rail link, facilitating connectivity from the Hajigak mines to Herat and onwards to Chabahar underscores India’s commitment to enhancing regional connectivity and fostering economic growth. 

Recognising the critical need to prevent the potential establishment of a government conducive to harbouring terrorist groups and offering strategic support to Pakistan, India has adopted a strategic approach centered on soft power engagement in Afghanistan. 

Furthermore, through engagement with the Taliban-led government, New Delhi seeks to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan while contributing to the country’s development and stability. This aligns with India’s commitment to supporting Afghan reconstruction efforts and fostering socio-economic development. 

India’s dedication to Afghanistan’s progress is conspicuous through substantial aid commitments, exceeding $2 billion by the close of 2017 and surpassing $3 billion in total investments. This positioned India as the fifth-largest investor in Afghanistan. In 2022, India coordinated the transportation of roughly 40,000 metric tons of wheat via land routes passing through Pakistan. This underscores India’s delicate position as it seeks to engage cautiously while recognising the necessity of interacting with the Taliban. 

In 2023, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce assessed its bilateral trade with India, valuing it at $779 million. The trade primarily consisted of exports amounting to $579 million, which predominantly comprised fruit, dried fruit and spices. Imports from India totalled $200 million, primarily consisting of sugar. India emerged as Afghanistan’s second-largest export destination following Pakistan. 

New Delhi’s focus has shifted away from prioritising defence and security measures, and instead placed attention on civilian sectors such as infrastructure development, human capital enhancement and mining initiatives. Noteworthy investments include the construction of the 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram, the Salma Dam project, the Pul-i-Khumri to Kabul power line and the Afghan Parliament building. Additionally, India has extended military aid and training to Afghan security forces. 

In 2023, Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar reiterated that India’s stance towards Afghanistan remains rooted in its longstanding ties, friendship with the Afghan people and adherence to pertinent UN resolutions, notably UN Security Council Resolution 2593. “We have deep-rooted historical and civilisational connections with Afghanistan.” He added: “Our collaborative development efforts have encompassed over 500 projects, spanning all 34 provinces. These initiatives focus on central sectors such as power, water supply, road infrastructure, healthcare, education, agriculture and capacity building.” 

Moreover, India has contributed to the education and healthcare sectors, by providing food aid to schoolchildren, constructing and rehabilitating schools and rebuilding the Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health. Furthermore, India’s engagement spans telecommunications, vocational training, and solar energy projects, showcasing a holistic approach to development assistance in Afghanistan. 

However, India’s engagement with the Taliban presents challenges and complexities. The Taliban’s history of oppressive governance, particularly women’s rights, poses ethical dilemmas for India. Balancing pragmatic diplomatic engagement with upholding democratic values will be a nuanced task for Indian policymakers. 

Additionally, India’s outreach to the Taliban could have broader implications for regional dynamics, especially other stakeholders such as Pakistan, Iran and the broader international community. The response of these countries to India’s engagement there will shape the future trajectory of Afghanistan’s geopolitics altogether. 

In July 2023, the leader of the Taliban, Hibatullah Akhunzada, issued a decree denouncing the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s cross-border attacks into Pakistan as prohibited. This declaration followed a diplomatic visit to Kabul by Pakistan’s Special Representative to Afghanistan, during which discussions were held regarding collaborative efforts between Pakistan, China and the Taliban concerning connectivity projects associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. 

However, tensions persist between Pakistan and the Taliban, with Islamabad concurrently undertaking a campaign to repatriate over a million Afghan refugees. Recognising the Taliban’s established authority in Afghanistan, the Indian strategic community regards this as a chance to cultivate closer relations. 

India has historically leveraged its relations with Afghanistan as a cost-effective strategy to maintain pressure on Pakistan regarding its perceived “strategic depth” aspirations. However, this strategy experienced a hiatus from 1996 to 2001 when the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan for the first time. During this period, India refrained from engaging with them, associating them directly with their creators, the Pakistan army/ISI. 

In the meeting with the Indian delegation, Hamid Karzai subtly alluded to past dynamics. Meanwhile, the Taliban, perceiving India’s visa policy towards Afghanistan as indicative of a lack of trust in their governance, advocated for visa liberalisation during their interaction. 

India, like other nations, does not officially recognise the Taliban regime. However, it has engaged with the group to a greater extent than many others. Presently, India provides refuge to over 15,000 Afghans under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, with the implementation of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) on March 12, 2024, India no longer extends its hospitality to Muslim refugees fleeing persecution in their homelands. Despite this policy shift, Afghan nationals, potentially the sole Muslim demographic in the region seeking Indian citizenship due to persecution in their native land, remain hopeful. 

The implementation of CAA is, however, expected to mark a salient juncture in the India-Afghanistan relationship, potentially altering public perceptions of India. Nonetheless, given the Taliban’s preference for retaining their citizens within Afghanistan, the impact on Kabul might be limited. 

Increasing financial investment by China in Chabahar signals a burgeoning influence in Afghanistan, presenting challenges to India’s strategic interests. The importance of Chabahar as a crucial trade corridor between India and Afghanistan underscores the imperative for stability along transit routes spanning Afghanistan to Central Asia. This stability is vital, particularly in the light of India’s escalating energy demands and its aspirations for expanded trade alliances. 

As observed during the power struggle at the Afghan Embassy in Delhi and the subsequent departure of diplomats appointed by the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan government, including Ambassador Farid Mamundzay, the Taliban has expressed a desire to establish its own representation in Delhi. 

In contrast, China maintains an ambassador-rank diplomat in Kabul and has also accepted a Taliban ambassador in Beijing, who presented credentials to President Xi Jinping in January. In Delhi, the Afghan embassy’s operations are currently managed by the consul-generals based in Mumbai and Hyderabad. However, considering the Taliban’s interest in enhancing trade with India, the necessity for a full-time representative in Delhi will require attention. 

The evolving diplomatic landscape, characterised by shifting alliances and competing interests, poses both challenges and opportunities for India’s engagement with Afghanistan. As China’s influence in Chabahar grows and the Taliban seeks to establish its presence in Delhi, India must navigate these complexities while safeguarding its strategic interests and fostering regional stability. 

—The writer is a Research Officer at Chennai Centre for China Studies. Her research interests constitute China – WANA (West Asia & North Africa) relations and human rights

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