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Water Woes

India is seeking to renegotiate the Treaty due to a confluence of political, environmental and security challenges. There is also a legal impasse over Pakistan wanting international arbitration in the issue

By Annunthra Rangan

Sixty-four years after its signing, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 is facing new pressures as India seeks to re­negotiate its terms. The Treaty, long celebrated for preventing water-related conflicts between India and Pakistan, is now under scrutiny in the light of changing political, environmental and security dynamics in the region.

In late August 2024, India formally notified Pakistan, requesting a “review and modification” of the IWT. This follows an earlier notification in January 2023, which focused on “modification” rather than a complete overhaul. The August notice signals India’s intent to significantly alter or potentially terminate the Treaty, reflecting a shift in its traditional approach to water-sharing agreements with Pakistan.

The IWT, signed in 1960 by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan, was brokered by the World Bank after nearly a decade of negotiations. It allocates the waters of the Indus River system between India and Pakistan, with the former receiving control over the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) and Pakistan controlling the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab). Although the majority of the western rivers were allocated to Pakistan, India retained limited rights to develop hydroelectric projects on them, provided such developments did not significantly impact downstream water flow to Pakistan.

This division was intended to resolve future water disputes, ensuring that both countries had access to sufficient water resources for their respective needs. The Treaty has often been hailed as one of the most successful water-sharing agreements in the world, surviving multiple conflicts between the two nuclear-armed neighbours, including wars in 1965, 1971 and 1999.

India’s dissatisfaction with the IWT has been growing over the years due to several factors. Under the current arrangement, India has access to only about 20% of the waters in the Indus basin, while Pakistan enjoys 80%. India, now the world’s most populous country, argues that this allocation no longer meets its needs, especially in the face of climate change, rapid population growth and increasing demand for energy, particularly from renewable sources such as hydropower.

India has expressed frustration with Pakistan’s objections to its hydropower projects, particularly the Kishanganga and Ratle projects on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers. Pakistan claims that these projects could impact its downstream water security by altering the flow of these rivers. India, on the other hand, maintains that the projects are in line with the Treaty’s provisions, which allow for “run-of-the-river” (RoR) hydroelectric developments, provided they do not involve significant storage or diversion of water. 

The issue escalated when Pakistan sought international arbitration to address its concerns, resulting in the involvement of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and a World Bank-appointed Neutral Expert. India has objected to the simultaneous use of both dispute resolution mechanisms, calling it impractical and in violation of the IWT’s guidelines. This legal impasse, coupled with India’s broader concerns about the Treaty’s limitations, has prompted its call for renegotiation.

India’s push to renegotiate the IWT stems from a confluence of political, environmental and security challenges. The primary factors driving this move includes India’s population which has grown significantly since the Treaty was signed, increasing demand for water resources. With over 1.4 billion people to support, the existing water allocation under the IWT is seen as inadequate to meet the country’s agricultural, industrial and domestic needs.

As India seeks to expand its renewable energy capacity, particularly through hydroelectric power, the limitations imposed by the IWT on water usage from the western rivers are increasingly seen as a barrier. India argues that the Treaty restricts its ability to harness its full hydroelectric potential, particularly in the context of its ambitious clean energy goals.

The Treaty, drafted over six decades ago, did not account for the impacts of climate change. Melting glaciers, changing precipitation patterns and decreasing river flows have added new pressures on water resources in the Indus basin. India contends that the IWT needs to be updated to address these evolving environmental challenges.

Relations between India and Pakistan have been strained for decades, with water becoming a strategic consideration in the broader geopolitical rivalry. Following the 2016 terrorist attack in Uri, Narendra Modi made a pointed remark: “Blood and water cannot flow together”, suggesting that water could be used as leverage in India’s border security strategy against Pakistan.

Central to the current deadlock is the disagreement over the IWT’s dispute resolution mechanism. The Treaty outlines a three-tier process for resolving disputes: issues are first addressed bilaterally through the Permanent Indus Commission, then referred to a Neutral Expert if necessary, and only if unresolved, escalated to the PCA.

In 2015, Pakistan requested the appointment of a Neutral Expert to examine its objections to India’s hydropower projects. However, in 2016, Pakistan retracted this request and instead proposed that the matter be adjudicated by the PCA. India objected to this, arguing that the Treaty required disputes to go through the Neutral Expert before involving the PCA. The World Bank eventually allowed both processes to proceed in parallel, leading to India’s refusal to participate in the PCA proceedings.

India has consistently expressed its frustration with Pakistan’s use of international arbitration, which it sees as a deviation from the IWT’s sequential dispute resolution process. This disagreement over the proper legal channels for resolving disputes has further fuelled India’s calls for renegotiation.

In addition to its dissatisfaction with the Treaty’s water allocation, India has raised concerns about Pakistan’s dam-building activities on the western rivers. For example, India has objected to the construction of the Diamer Basha Dam in Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan, arguing that the project was being built in a disputed territory and could negatively impact downstream water flows into Indian-controlled Kashmir.

India’s concerns over water security are compounded by environmental challenges. The country is experiencing severe water stress due to factors such as groundwater depletion, poor water management and the effects of climate change. Internal disputes over water access, particularly in Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan, have added to the sense of urgency for India to secure more reliable water resources.

India’s push for renegotiation comes at a time when climate change is dramatically reshaping the global landscape. The IWT, designed in the 1960s, did not anticipate the demographic and environmental pressures now faced by both India and Pakistan. With glaciers melting and river flows decreasing, the pressure on shared water resources is expected to intensify in the coming decades.

As India seeks to adapt the Treaty to address these new challenges, Pakistan remains wary of any changes that could undermine its access to the Indus waters. The two countries must find a way to balance their competing interests while addressing the environmental realities that threaten the long-term viability of the Indus River system.

Whether the IWT can be successfully renegotiated to meet the needs of both countries, or becomes another casualty of their enduring rivalry, will depend largely on the willingness of India and Pakistan to engage in meaningful dialogue and cooperation. 

Also, to ensure the long-term sustainability of the Indus Valley ecosystems, India must incorporate the concept of Environmental Flows as outlined in the Brisbane Declaration and endorsed by the 2013 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the Kishanganga dispute. This would allow for better management of water resources, addressing both ecological and human needs in the face of climate change. Moreover, India could explore the possibility of leveraging climate change as a “change in circumstances” under international law, potentially opening discussions on renegotiating the IWT in response to evolving environmental challenges. 

A World Bank-supervised, legally binding framework for monitoring water quality and flow would enhance trust and cooperation. This step would align with international legal standards, particularly the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention and the 2004 Berlin Rules, providing a more sustainable approach to water resource management. 

Additionally, India must actively enhance its infrastructure to maximise the use of its allocated water from the western rivers, especially through repairing and upgrading the canal systems in Punjab and Rajasthan. Balancing proactive measures in water utilisation with diplomatic and legal strategies will allow India to better navigate the complex challenges posed by the IWT while safeguarding its national interests. 

—The writer is a Research Officer at Chennai Centre for China Studies. Her research interests constitute China-WANA (West Asia and North Africa) relations and human rights

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