By Inderjit Badhwar
When President Donald Trump announced the revival of the United States-China “Group of Two” in 2025, most observers dismissed it as political theatre. After all, the idea of a strategic duet between the world’s two largest powers seemed an anachronism in an era defined by rivalry, sanctions, and mutual suspicion. Yet, as our cover story by Annunthra Rangan reveals, history has an uncanny way of looping back on itself—and the legal, economic, and strategic ramifications of this renewed G-2 could be profound.
The concept of a G-2 is not new. First articulated by economist C Fred Bergsten nearly two decades ago, it imagined the United States and China as co-managers of global economic stability. In the post-financial-crisis world, such an arrangement made theoretical sense: two giant economies, collectively representing nearly 40 percent of global GDP, could—if aligned—stabilize the international system. Yet that experiment never matured. Mistrust, ideological divergence, and growing Chinese assertiveness left the idea stillborn.
What makes its 2025 revival both remarkable and troubling is context. The world of today is not bipolar, but fractured: multipolar in aspiration, transactional in practice, and legally unsettled. Trade regimes are under strain, sanctions have become blunt policy tools, and the architecture of global governance—from the WTO to the UNFCCC—is creaking under the weight of competing sovereignties. Into this uncertainty walks the G-2, an old duet in a new hall.
Annunthra’s piece asks the essential question: what happens to middle powers—particularly India—when great powers attempt to rewrite the rules of engagement?
Her answer is sobering. India, she argues, finds itself once again at the crossroads of someone else’s geometry. In 1972, Nixon’s outreach to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai altered the logic of the Cold War and forced India into a reluctant embrace with Moscow. In 2025, a transactional thaw between Washington and Beijing could have similar ripple effects.
But what’s different today—and legally significant—is the domain in which power is exercised. It’s not just trade and defence anymore; it’s the regulation of technology, data, digital finance, artificial intelligence, and supply-chain security. Each of these is governed by an evolving legal and institutional framework—often opaque, rarely inclusive, and largely defined by the same powers now seeking a fresh G-2 understanding.
Consider digital governance. If Washington and Beijing find common ground on aspects of data regulation, cyber norms, or AI safety standards, the consequences would cascade across the Global South. India’s ambitious digital public infrastructure—built on openness and interoperability—could find itself squeezed between two closed-loop regulatory ecosystems. Similar dilemmas loom in climate finance, cross-border taxation, and intellectual property frameworks.
In short, the G-2 is not merely a diplomatic experiment. It is a potential legal architecture—one that could bypass or redefine existing multilateral systems.
The timing of this debate could not be more critical. The United States is struggling to reconcile its “America First” impulses with its dependence on Chinese manufacturing and critical minerals. China, while outwardly confident, faces slowing growth and the need for external stabilization. Both have an incentive to create a temporary détente—a breathing space in which to regroup.
Yet, as our cover story shows, temporary truces can still redraw permanent boundaries. For India, which has invested in both strategic autonomy and deep partnerships with the West, this moment calls for precision diplomacy and legal foresight. India cannot afford to be the object of others’ deals; it must position itself as a rule-maker, not a rule-taker.
That’s why this story is not only about geopolitics, but about law—the law of trade, technology, and territory. It reminds us that every diplomatic handshake leaves fingerprints on treaties, tariffs, and the texture of global order. The revived G-2 may be wrapped in the rhetoric of stability, but behind the scenes lies a struggle to define the next generation of international norms.
This issue, therefore, is dedicated to exploring the new legal geography of power. Our contributors look at how trade courts are adapting to protectionist regimes, how data-localization laws are reshaping investment flows, and how strategic alignments are rewriting rules of engagement in cyberspace and the South China Sea alike.
We are entering a phase where geopolitics and jurisprudence are inseparable. The G-2 may or may not endure—but the legal precedents it sets could last far longer than any summit communiqué.
As readers, analysts, and citizens, we are all implicated in this unfolding order. The world’s new duet will test not only the balance of power, but also the boundaries of law itself.